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Abstract
Prior research has suggested that intellectual capital within the Aerospace Industry has
been in decline. The new design aircraft experience base of Post WWIV Aerospace
Engineers was approximately 6-12 new design aircraft per career. In contrast, an
aerospace engineer starting his career today may experience only one, maybe two new
aircraft designs during their career. Anecdotal evidence has been published linking this
trend to problems experienced in many recent aircraft programs. Counter arguments
cite rapid advances in design, manufacturing and information technologies used in the
design and development process of today's new design aircraft have compensated for
some or all of declining experience base. This thesis focuses on exploring the validity of
this counter argument.
Program performance metrics were established and utilized to draw comparisons
between programs. In addition, extensive interviews with personnel who played roles in
these programs were conducted to that the root cause in areas of differing performance
were understood.
Analysis of the data gathered revealed that the predecessor programs outperformed the
more recent programs. Recommendations regarding ways to mitigate intellectual capital
performance gap are presented.
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Title: Research Associate, Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
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71 Introduction
1.1  Problem Statement
Prior research has suggested that intellectual capital (IC) within the Aerospace Industry
has been in decline. The new design aircraft experience base of Post WWIV Aerospace
Engineers was approximately 6-12 new design aircraft per career. In contrast, an
aerospace engineer starting his career today may experience only one, maybe two new
aircraft designs during their career. Anecdotal evidence has been published linking this
trend to problems experienced in many recent aircraft programs. Counter arguments
cite rapid advances in design, manufacturing and information technologies used in the
design and development process of today's new design aircraft have compensated for
some or all of declining experience base. This thesis focuses on providing an explicit
link between declining intellectual capital and program performance by extracting
quantitative data on the performance of new design civil aircraft programs which have
recently with aircraft programs which were executed 20 to 25 years prior. By the nature
of the approach taken, the validity of the popular counter argument is explored.
2 Literature Review
To a great extent, this research is a response to a RAND study published in 1992 titled;
Maintaining Future Military Design Capability  (ref 1). This report examined historical
trends in the aerospace industry and their projected impact on the ability of the United
States to design and develop aircraft weapons systems. The most striking trend was the
declining rate at which new design aircraft are developed. Figure 2-1 is a modified
version of the chart published in this report used to characterize this phenomena. As
can be seen, the decline with respect to the 1950's has been dramatic. Overlayed
horizontal bars are used to represent the typical career of an aerospace engineer or
designer.  The point was further made that as the frequency of new aircraft design
introductions drops, so does the average number of aircraft programs an aerospace
8employee will interact with during their career. Currently, this number is down to one for
persons entering this industry within the past decade or in the foreseeable future. The
authors further write, “We believe that a declining experience level has been a
contributing factor to the problems we observe in many recent aircraft programs.” The
aircraft programs cited are the T-46, B-1B, P-7 and A-12 programs. It is not stated how
this conclusion was arrived at since no details are provided which directly link the
performance issues of these programs to this declining experience base.  It is however,
an easy concept to accept from a common sense standpoint. And, judging by the
frequency that this chart and quote is cited in other publications, it has been widely
accepted.
Figure 2-1 RAND Study Depiction of declining intellectual capital in Aerospace Industry
The RAND study also surfaces the most popular counter argument raised when
discussions of declining intellectual capital occur, modern computational tools. In some
respects, a form of codified knowledge.  "Some have suggested that the application of
large-scale computer simulation to the design process will mitigate the need for
“We Believe That a Declining Experience Level 
Has Been a Contributing Factor to the Problems 
We Observe in Many Recent Aircraft Programs.”
RAND
*Ref: RAND Study
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9experienced designers. While simulation and automation  of the design process will
certainly help, it cannot substitute for the intuition and inspiration that contribute to
successful new and innovative designs. Furthermore, such automation is only
marginally effective when dealing with new and untried technologies because the basic
information needed for the computational algorithms is missing or of low fidelity." (ref.1)
As with the prior theory, this is a rational conclusion that is easy to swallow, but is not
explicitly proven in this work. Several engineering managers from within the aerospace
industry which were queried about this conclusion exhibited mixed reactions. One hand
they have been spending unprecedented amounts of money each year to secure the
latest computational tools. On the other hand, they were not exactly sure of how
effective these tools at mitigating lost intellectual capital.
This is not a unique phenomena to aerospace, other industries are wrestling with
intellectual capital issues. Shawn Ritchie (ref.2) discusses such issues with regards to
the photo processing equipment industry. " Eastman Kodak has seen a slow eroding of
the tacit dimension (knowledge) over the past few decades. One reason for this is the
aging of the personnel base. In the past, the younger employees would be assigned to
work side by side with the more experienced workers, establishing a mentor-protégé
relationship. This relationship led to a slow, thorough transfer of tacit and explicit
knowledge. In recent years, employees have been let go or encouraged to retire early
without any emphasis on tacit knowledge transfer. Managers expect new workers to
come in trained or to quickly pick things up on the job after a few shifts and cursory
reading of operations manuals. Why? One theory is that companies do not know what
they are missing anything and simply have no way to quantify "lost opportunity." They
do not know the opportunity cost or value of information not transferred."
As with the RAND study, Ritchie's work does not explicitly demonstrate that knowledge
transfer has in fact eroded Kodak's ability to perform faster than other imrrovements
such as computational tools have enhanced it.
10
Articles published in aerospace industry periodicals discuss "brain drain" and various
steps some of the major prime contractors such as Northrup Grumman are taking to
attack this problem. Again, no articles or research was discovered which explicitly linkd
declining IC with declining performance. Taking advantage of this lack of prior attention,
this thesis is on filling this void.
3 Methods
3.1  New Design Aircraft Case Study
Case study of four new design civil aircraft programs. New design referring to "clean
sheet" designs which do not significantly leverage a predecessor aircraft design in the
design, development and certification process. Two of the aircraft programs were
executed nearly simultaneously in the late 1970's and will be referred to as the "disco
era" programs. The seceding pair were executed during the mid to late 1990's and will
be referred to as the "Microsoft (MS) era" programs. Additional details of these
programs and their associated aerospace manufacturers will be provided in subsequent
sections.
Several criteria utilized in selecting these case studies which can be divided into
subsets, similarity criteria and dissimilarity criteria. All of the programs share the
following characteristics:
• New design Civil Aircraft certified to the same general Federal Airworthiness
Regulations (FAR's).
• Developed Using Company funds
• Developed to meet similar performance and market requirements
• Certified to the same FAR regulations
• Companies have long and rich aviation legacy (didn't start yesterday)
• Have significant US Military business and are to some extent categorized as
a "defense contractor"
11
The "disco era" programs share the following:
• Same period of execution
• Competing head to head in the same market
• High workforce new design aircraft experience base
• Predominantly Paper & Mylar design tools
• Functional Organization with "heavy weight" project managers
The "MS era" programs share the following:
• Overlapping periods of execution
• Overlapping market segments
• Extensive use of computer aided design tools and information technologies
• Use of IPDT's
The subsequent list highlights the dissimilarities between the disco and MS era
programs:
• Organic IC significantly lower for MS era programs than preceding disco era
programs
• Use of computer aided design tools significantly greater for MS era programs
Various means of comparison, discussed further in subsequent sections, will be utilized
to develop an understanding as to the relationship between the performance of these
programs and disco/MS set of dissimilarities.
3.2 Data collection
Case study data was collected from a variety of sources, official program documents,
industry publications and interviews of participants. These multiple sources of data were
used to cross validate the data. While it was desired to have comparable data depth
between all programs there are some variables. Identifying and accessing participants
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was more difficult for the disco era programs as they occurred twenty plus years ago.
The majority of the participants have since retired or worse. Since, most internal
documentation is discarded within a few short years of completion, this proved
challenging for both the disco and MS era programs. However, in two of the cases,
excellent internal documents were obtained from hard core "pack rats".
Aviation Industry publications such as Jane's, All the World's Aircraft, Air & Cosmos,
Aviation World as well as many others, were used to gathering information regarding
the subject case study aircraft program. In total, hundreds of articles were reviewed for
each aircraft program. Jane's, All the World's Aircraft was particularly useful in gathering
aircraft performance attribute data.
3.3 Metrics
Four types of metrics were employed , aircraft attribute based metrics, design maturity
metrics, program performance metrics and intellectual capital metrics.
3.3.1 Aircraft Attribute Based Metrics
Traditional aircraft attributes, tracked closely internally, advertised and sometime
guaranteed to prospective customers are utilized as metrics. These metrics,
summarized below, are referenced the original specification values released at the
launch of the program. To aid in direct comparisons of the four programs, the metrics
are expressed in terms of percentage with respect to the reference value.
o Empty Weight
o Useful Load / Payload
o Maximum Takeoff Weight
o Range
o Altitude Performance
3.3.1.1 Weight Derived Metrics
In military and some civil aircraft procurement competitions, often, the ability to retard
weight growth during design and development is the discriminator between the winning
and loosing team. Further, there a
due to burgeoning weight. In the m
aircraft's specification displaces e
weight of an aircraft is 150 lb. over 
or fuel (25 gal.) must be left behind
maximum take off gross weight b
which may not exist, or would req
escalating the weight growth. This
manufacturer has experienced at o
The aircraft will primarily be judged
based metrics supplemental ma
compiled for similar type aircraft
publications.
3.3.1.2 Range
Range is a universal metric for all 
these comparisons, the maximum
reserves is used to reflect the cri
passenger load and not a maximu
impacts the allowable fuel load and
the specified range at the outset of
certificate.
3.3.1.3 Altitude Performance
The ability to take off from a field 
"hot/high") where the air density is 
metric. This capability is important 
aircraft. Normally expressed in term
expressed in terms of percent dev
this comparison. For instance, if t13
re many documented cases of programs cancelled
ore modest situations, empty weight exceeding the
ither payload or fuel. In other words, if the empty
specification, a passenger, 150 lb. of baggage, cargo
. The payload deficit can be closed by increasing the
y 150 lb., possibly requiring an uprated powerplant
uire the redesign of some aircraft systems, further
 is an insidious feed-forward loop that every aircraft
ne time or another.
 with respect to each other, however for the weight
nufacturer weight control performance data was
 the Society of Allied Weight Engineers (SAWE)
commercial and military aircraft. For the purposes of
 range with a full passenger load and standard
teria of a commercial customer. In specifying a full
m gross weight ensures that adverse weight growth
 in turn the range. The essential comparison will be
 the program versus its range upon receiving its type
under hot day and/or high altitude conditions (aka:
low and the power margins lower is also a universal
to a customer as it is directly related the safety of an
s of standard day altitude in feet or meters, it will be
iation for the initial specification for the purposes of
he initial specification for an aircraft stated that its
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takeoff capability at maximum gross weight to be 10,000 ft, and at type certification it
was verified to be 12,000 ft. It capability would be + 20%.
3.3.2 Design Maturity Metrics
3.3.2.1 Flight test hours to achieve Type Certification
For a new design aircraft, the number of flight test hours to achieve flight type
certification is a measure as to the maturity of the design going in to flight test. The
actual type certification flight testing is not a great variable but the amount of flight
testing required to get the aircraft to a certifiable configuration. For example, it could
require several hundred flight testing hours to get the handling qualities of an aircraft to
the point where it will comply with the airworthiness requirements. A common scenario
would be for a set of flight test to be repeated many times with changes to the flight
control software, tail planform area, strake configuration etc. until the correct
combination is found. I contrast, a new design which has undergone a  more effective
design and risk reduction process, whether it be attributed to superior tools, personnel
of more risk reduction testing, will converge on the certifiable configuration with less
flight testing hours. This is compounded by the number of systems that are subject to
certification of other functional requirements.
No universal benchmark has been established for this metric. However, since all aircraft
are similar in terms of type, complexity and applicable FAR's, the values can be
compared directly.
3.3.2.2 Major Specification Changes
This metric is intended to gauge the quality of the product development process. If
perfect, the aircraft configuration which achieve type certification would be identical to
the aircraft defined by the initial design trade studies and detail design efforts. This
captures inadequacies in a design which are not reflected by the aircraft attributes. For
instance; consider an aircraft under development whose range specification is 3000 nm.
If during it’s the development the engines specific fuel consumption is recognized to be
15
10% greater than anticipated, the manufacturer is likely in one of two manners. He
could reduce the specified range to by 300 nm. if he feels that it would not hurt the
salability of the aircraft. Alternatively, he could revise the design to recover the lost
range by increasing the fuel capacity or another alternatives. Either scenario would be
counted as a specification change. The intent is to pick up high impact changes which
cause significant redesign efforts or reduction in the aircraft's advertised capabilities or
compliance with airworthiness regulations. Changing the gauge of a skin panel, or
altering the seat pitch would not qualify as a major change. This criteria is fairly
consistent with the fidelity of information contained in trade publication.
Of the subject aircraft examined only the nine spec change categories resulted. These
are summarized in Table
Table 1: Summary of Applicable Major Specification Changes
1. Maximum Takeoff Gross Weight
2. Useful Load
3. Range
4. Fuel Capacity increases of >5%
5. Significant Reduction or migration of the Center of Gravity Range
6. Key Aircraft configuration dimensions including the fuselage,
empennage and lifting surface (including airfoil sections)
7. Propulsion / Drive system rating increase
8. Altitude Take off Performance
9. Any Major Sub-System Redesign
3.3.3 Program Performance Based Metrics
3.3.3.1 Schedule Deviation
All aircraft development programs have a schedule as to when critical milestones are to
be achieved. The aircraft models date of; first flight, type certification and first aircraft
delivery will be used as benchmarks. The performance metric will be deviation between
the initial dates and the date that they are actually achieved.
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3.3.4 Intellectual Capital Metrics
Two very simple the intellectual capital metrics were established for each manufacturer
and used for comparison purposes. The first is the frequency of new design aircraft
introduction in the decade preceeding the program launch of a aircraft considered. This
is a measure of the intellectual capital accrued by the design team functional leads and
workforce at task level. The second is nearly the same as the first but considers the
number of new design aircraft introduced in the prior two decades. This is an indicator
of the experience level of the middle level managers, senior technical staff and program
management. These metrics were influenced by the RAND experience decay plot in
Figure 2-1
3.4 Interviews
Interviews of key participants of the subject programs were conducted to gain better
insight into events and specific performance issues. In all, thirty participants were
interviewed. Ten of the interviewees were directly involved with programs from both
eras. The interviewees were told that all of the information would be disguised prior to
publication.
Interviews followed and informal structure, usually opening with a general overview of
the thesis problem statement and the case study method selected to study the issues.
From there "lay of the land" type questions framed from a historical perspective were
used to get the dialogue launched.  All of the interviewees were comfortable providing
information, and seemed to feel it was important to contribute to an understanding of
performance issues. The interviewer took a neutral posture during the interview so as
not to lead the interviewee in any particular direction.
Performance metrics, were used to steer the interview to specific areas of discussion.
Follow-up questions were used to fill in information voids and for clarification of remarks.
When specific documents were referenced during the interview, the interviewer would
be "do you still have a copy of that memo, document etc" Often times the interviewee
17
would dig through their files to find relevant documents without being prompted.  About
two thirds of the interviews produced copies of original documents with information
pertinent to one or more of the case studies.
Cross interview triangulation was used as a method to gain an alternative perspective
on a event or to verify information obtained. This was particularly helpful in sorting out
old documents with conflicting information.
Interviews were recorded with hand written notes. These notes, being typically
somewhat cryptic were reviewed within one hour of the completion of the interview and
additional notes added to help improve the post-interview recall. When needed, follow
up questions and clarifications were pursued by email.  Handfuls of interviews were
conducted by email correspondence only due to geographic constraints.
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4 CASE STUDY DATA
4.1 Bush BA140
4.1.1.1 Initial Plan
The Bush BA140 program was officially launched in early 1974. It was preceded by a
series off marketing and configuration studies that culminated with the construction of a
full scale aircraft mock-up. The mock-up was brought to air shows and industry
conventions to get further feedback from potential oil exploration and business
customers. The BA140 was aimed at the same market as the SW-24, also featured as a
cases study program. The aircraft was well received and Bush had no difficulty taking
orders for the aircraft.
Figure 4-1: Annual Aircraft Deliveries / Bush Aircraft
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4.1.1.2 Prelude to BA140
Prior to embarking on the BA140 program, Bush was delivering over 30 civil aircraft per
month and a somewhat higher number of military aircraft per month. About this
timeframe, DoD deliveries of the BA50, BA70 and BA100 series models were dropping
as DoD was in the process of fostering contracts for the development of a new
generation of replacements for the aircraft (ref. Figure 4-1). Bush competed for these
new contracts but lion's shares of these contracts were awarded to competitors. Bush
did capture a significant military aircraft upgrade program and a NASA X-plane
program, which were in progress during this timeframe.
The BA140 would be the first new design aircraft since the B70, 14 years previous.
Bush also launched the BA130 and BA150 development and certification programs.
These were improved civil version of the BA60/70 models. These announcements
succeeded the BA140 model's initial Type Certification.  However, according to one of
the sources interviewed, there was a significant amount of overlap between these
programs.
4.1.1.3 Program Structure
Heavy weight project team best describes the structure of the BA140 program. The
entire team was located in a separate building across town from the main facilities. The
engineering leads reported to, and were rated by the program management staff.
Reportedly, this was a controversial arrangement at the time, fueling much discussion
and concern regarding to use of "best practices" by the engineers, now isolated from
the functional organizations.
Ex-Bush employees queried, regarded the BA140 team was "top notch". Its program
director, project engineers and much of the functional engineering staff highly
experienced with aircraft development, having worked on a variety of military and civil
programs during their tenures. The number of military and civil models (including
20
derivatives), developed in the prior decade, Bush's production and R&D activity certainly
supports this characterization. This is discussed further in the subsequent section.
4.1.1.4 Intellectual Capital
During the timeframe of the BA140 development, Bush employed 10,000 approximately
workers of which 14% were represented by the engineering and design disciplines (ref.
5). For a period of at least ten years prior to the BA140 program, Bush has a steady diet
of production contracts and a few research contracts. Its work force was relatively stable
during this time period, not experiencing any significant downsizing until 1980's. Many
Bush many employees migrated to competitors that had captured the large long-term
military contracts that eluded Bush. This was subsequent to the launch and certification
of the BA140.
Figure 4-2: Frequency of New Design Aircraft Introductions / Bush Aircraft
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According to sources interviewed, about 65% percent of its BA140's technical workforce
had made significant contribution to experience in the design and development of three
or more derivative or and experimental research aircraft prior to the BA140 program.
Figure 4-2 presents a summary of the frequency of fielding new aircraft designs for
Bush. While not clear from this chart, the last bona fide new design production aircraft,
the B70, preceded the BA140 by 10 years. However, during this duration, Bush
continued to develop advanced wing, propulsion and material technologies through US
government funded research programs as well as self-funded research. New
technology was gradually introduced into existing aircraft models as in-line
improvements and numerous new / derivative models.  In short, there existed ample
opportunities for the BA140 team to accrue significant amount of derivative aircraft
experience as well as a more modest amount of new aircraft experience.
4.1.1.5 Tools
This program predated the era of Computer Aided Design (CAD). The majority of the
design work was done on the traditional ink on Mylar medium. Mainframe based aero,
aeroelastic and flight simulation computer codes were used. Structural analyses relied
on early, mainframe versions of NASTRAN, indigenous aircraft loads prediction codes
coupled with an equivalent amount of traditional paper and pencil hand analyses. Slide
Rules were used commonly but were starting to be displaced with hand held and desk-
top calculators. Mainframe computers were also employed for program management
functions.
4.1.1.6 Type Certification
The BA140 received its VFR type certification 11 months later than the original target
date. At the time of certification, a backlog of over 100 aircraft had been accrued. This
number doubled within the next year.
VFR Type certification experienced further delays and the schedule variance increased
to 17 months by the time IFR type certification was achieved.
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Table 2 provides a summary of the performance metrics at type certification.
Table 2: Bush BA140 / Metric Variance Summary
Metric Deviation
We +21%
Useful Load +14%
Payload +16%
MTOGW +18%
Range -30%
Fuel +12%
HOGE -36%
HIGE -21%
First Flight +8 mo.
Type Certification (VFR) +11 mo.
Type Certification (IFR) +17 mo.
Initial Delivery +10 mo.
Major Spec Changes 9
4.1.1.7 Post Certification Development Activity
The BA140 introduced in to service through an official "launch customer", standard
procedure for the aircraft industry during this timeframe. The BA140 launch customers
experienced its share of new aircraft teething problems. Reliability of the aircraft
subsystems and main wing fatigue concerns reduced the availability and increased the
operating cost of the aircraft. To address these problems, initially, Bush made sure that
sufficient spares and dedicated field representatives were available to the BA140's
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launch customers . This was followed up with the introduction of field retrofit kits of
redesigned components. While this was not a desirable situation, it is fairly typical
situation for a new aircraft's introduction in to service.
More serious was the aircraft's performance shortfalls in payload and range which
limited the productivity of the aircraft for many of the operators. In addition, the BA140
experienced delays in achieving its IFR certification, further reducing its productivity for
operations that required this capability.
4.1.1.8 IFR BA140 B and B+
To address the shortcomings of the initial BA140, Bush followed up quickly with an
improved and IFR certified BA140B model. The first BA140B was delivered in August
1982. It featured more powerful engines (+8%) and uprated drive system, a 30%
increase in fuel capacity and a 5 % increase in maximum take-off gross weight. The
majority of the BA140A models were upgraded to the BA140B configuration.
In less than one year, Bush was offering a further improved version, the BA140B+. It
featured a further 18% increased fuel capacity, additional seating and a reduced empty
weight. It was adopted as the standard production configuration. These changes were
aimed at further improving the payload / range performance of the aircraft, which had
yet to achieve the original performance claims.
Unfortunately, poor engine reliability and performance continued burden the operators
and mar the aircraft's reputation. Aircraft sales of the BA140 at this point in time were
well below the early projections.
4.1.1.9 Subsequent Derivatives
Subsequent to BA140B+, three additional derivative models of the BA140 have been
offered by Bush, the BA140SP, B160 and the B190. Each successive version featured
increased power takeoff gross weight and range and superceded its predecessor as the
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base production model.The B190, Bush's current offering also features a moderate
cabin stretch, FADEC equipped engines and a glass cockpit. Despite Bush's support of
this model, sales have yet to reach the potential predicted at the outset of the BA140
program.
4.1.2 Program Performance Metrics
4.1.2.1 Weight Derived
The constant growth of the BA140's weight empty and maximum takeoff gross weight
during the development program indicate that the program had difficulty with weigh
control. Four published maximum takeoff gross weights were found in a variety of
publications prior to receiving its initial VFR type certification. A fifth followed as the
aircraft received IFR certification.  Clearly, the increments were aimed at delivering an
acceptable payload for its customers. The weight metric data is extracted from Jane's
All the Worlds Aircraft (ref.4).
4.1.2.2 Range
The BA140 suffered a continuous decline in range performance throughout its
development. Even at the outset of the program, a full fuel load plus full passengers
was only possible with the lightweight passengers with no baggage. This could have
been a requirements oversight as the spec FAA passenger is 170 lb., much lighter than
the typical passenger who would fly in this aircraft is.
 As its weight grew, the fuel system was enlarged to recover lost range. Two auxiliary
fuel tank arrangements were developed for customers who were willing to trade some
payload for range. By the time the aircraft reached certification, its range capability was
30% lower than the initial target specification. This shortfall excluded it from certain
markets. The initial two derivative models, the BA140B and BA140B+ featured
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increased fuel capacities of 30% and 48% respectively, a validation of the range
shortfall conclusion.
4.1.2.3 Altitude
The altitude performance for the BA140 at Type Certification fell 36% short of the
original specification. The aircraft could exceed the original specification at the original
spec gross weight though.  Again pointing the finger at excess weight gain during
design and development.
 This capability was improved upon with the BA140B model, which featured increased
engine and drive system ratings. As stated in the prior section, most BA140A models
were upgraded to this configuration.
4.1.2.4 Frequency of Major Specification Changes
Ten major specifications changes were gleaned from various aviation industry
references. Four of the nine changes are attributed to increases to the maximum takeoff
gross weight of the aircraft which occurred in increments of 3%, 7.5%, 6.3%, and 2.6%
respectively for a cumulative total of 17.2% over the original design specification. Three
are attributed to engine and or drive system takeoff rating increases and one to a fuel
tankage redesign which yielded a 15% increase in capacity. Early in the flight test
program, the horizontal tail was move forward significantly. And lastly, a redesign of the
main wing, increasing it's span by 2% and chord by 8% for an area increase of 10%.
4.1.2.5 Flight Test Hours to Obtain Type Certification
According to data published in trade publications, three thousand flight hours were
accrued on BA140 flight test aircraft in order to gain its VFR Type Certificate. Due to the
lack of published data, it was not possible to construct a creditable estimate of the
incremental flight testing hours required to achieve its IFR type certification.
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4.2 Swamp SW-24
4.2.1 Overview
4.2.1.1 Initial Plan
Swamp announcement of  SW-24 program occurred early in the year 1975. This was
followed by a study phase during which time market research, competitive
benchmarking and launch customers were sought. The SW-24 featured the latest
technology used in the SW-18 to achieve maximum performance and to reduce risk.
Program launch with the backing of Swamp's parent corporation occurred about one
year after the program was announced. The initial press releases at this time cited mid
1976 for with FAA certification and initial deliveries in late 1977 followed by rate
production in 1978 (ref. 4). A launch customer was signed on for the initial ten aircraft
shortly after to the launch announcement.
4.2.1.2 Prelude to SW-24
During the mid-1970's, Swamp was delivering new SW-9, SW-12 and the SW-13 model
aircraft at rates of 20-40 per year along with 10-20 upgraded SW-9's. An all time low
point in Swamp's history according to those interviewed. Figure 4-3 provides a summary
of Swamp's production deliveries from this low point  forward, compiled from internal
records.
Prior to embarking on the SW-24 program, Swamp was fully involved in the later phases
of the NUAC (New Utility Aircraft) program competition with Big Valley Aircraft. The SW-
18 prototype's first flight had preceded the SW-24 program announcement by 3 months.
Although Swamp would be awarded this contract twenty-three months later, uphill
battles to solve design problems, and a "winner takes all" fly-off competition lay ahead.
In short, there was much uncertainty in Swamp's future.
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Figure 4-3: Annual Aircraft Deliveries / Swamp Aircraft
4.2.1.3 Program Structure
A heavy weight project team, staffed with functional engineering organization leads best
describes the structure of the SW-24 program. The functional leads were responsible
for making sure that the project tasks were supported by the functional organizations.
The program manager and chief of design were highly experienced and previously held
equivalent positions on the NUAC program. The functional organization leads, were
hand picked by the chief of design according to their experience. The majorities were
fresh off the NUAC program.
The program was also staffed with dedicated administrators and finance personnel to
help with project management tasks.
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In order to segregate the SW-24 activities from that of other government funded
activities, the majority of the SW-24 team was located in a separate facility in an
adjacent town. According to interviews, this was vital to the programs success as the
main facility was experiencing many difficulties in their effort to prepare for SW-18 rate
production. Production rates not experienced for many years and a ten fold increase
over the current aircraft production rate.
Figure 4-4: Frequency of New Aircraft Introductions / Swamp
This is captured in part by Figure 4-3 which chronicles aircraft deliveries for the period
just subsequent to the awarded of the NUAC contract and type certification of the SW-
24. To the left side of this chart, one can see the rapid rate of increase for deliveries of
both the NUAC and SW-24.  According to one of the sources interviewed, "The main
plant was in turmoil trying to ramp up for NUAC production. Any available body in main
plant ended to be commandeered to work on the NUAC program. Therefore, it was
recognized in the early phases of the program that an off site facility was imperative for
the programs success."
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4.2.1.4 Intellectual Capital
The program manager and chief of design were highly experienced and previously held
equivalent positions on the NUAC program. In addition, the majority of the functional
organization leads had 15-20 years experience and had contributed to design and
development of three to six other  "clean sheet of paper" aircraft according to sources
interviewed. . This information seems realistic when compared  the number of new
designs fielded by Swamp  in the preceding decades, presented in Figure 4-4. The
functional organization leads, according to one of the participants interviewed, were
hand picked by the "chief of design" "as a prerequisite to his acceptance of this position.
accepting the assignment as chief of design, Al Albert insisted that he must be able to
hand pick his team." As such, the team of functional engineering leads consisted of the
most experienced engineers, many of that were fresh off the NUAC program or one of
the other development programs.
4.2.1.5 Tools
This program predated the era of Computer Aided Design (CAD). The majority of the
design work was done on the traditional ink on Mylar medium. Mainframe based aero,
aero-elastic and flight simulation computer codes were used extensively, and
complimented with 1/10 scale,1/5 scale, and full scale subsystem wind tunnel testing.
Structural analyses relied on early, mainframe versions of NASTRAN, indigenous
aircraft loads prediction codes coupled with an equivalent amount of traditional paper
and pencil hand analyses. Slide Rules were used commonly but were starting to be
displaced with hand held and desk-top calculators. Mainframe computers were also
employed to track the program budgets.
4.2.1.6 Type Certification
The SW-24 program was swiftly executed with type certification occurring within 6
months of the original target date. At the time of certification, a backlog of over 200
aircraft had been accrued. This number doubled within the next year. Table 3 provides a
30
summary of the performance metrics at type certification. These metrics are discussed
further in subsequent sections.
Table 3: SW-24 Metric Variance Summary
Metric Deviation
We (lb) +7%
MTOGW (lb) +3.1%
We/MTOGW +3.6%
Useful Load (lb) +2%
Range (nm) +4 %
HIGE (ft) +22%
HOGE (ft) -15%
First Flight +9 mo.
Type Certification +6 mo.
Initial Delivery +8 mo.
Major Specification Changes 3
4.2.1.7 Post Certification Activity
While the program had been executed successfully from a many technical and business
perspectives, the initial SW-24 production models its share of teething problems. In the
initial two years many reliability issues arose, of which some had Airworthiness
Directives (AD) issued against, often requiring inconvenient special inspections and
unscheduled maintenance. The engines were experiencing a high rate of in-flight
shutdowns and were not providing adequate power margins for some operations.
In addition, the UK SW-24 operators had range issues due to additional equipment
required by the CAA for over-water operations. This required them to reduce their
passenger counts.
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Customers exerted pressure on Swamp to resolve these issues. Swamp responded by
putting together a special task force comprised of engineering and customer service
personnel. The team's charter was to identify the root cause of the field problems and to
implement corrective actions swiftly. Initially, the availability was dramatically improved
by providing stocks of critical spare parts to operators on consignment and dedicated
on-site field representatives. Introduction of field retrofit kits, which included redesigned
components, followed. The weights of the aircraft escalated as these changes were
incorporated.
 This team stayed in place for two years before it was disbanded. At least one of the
sources interviewed was of the opinion that this effort demonstrated the companies
commitment to the customers and likely saved the program from an early demise.
4.2.1.8 SW-24 MkIV
The introduction of the SW-24A Mark IV, a mature and more reliable SW-24 occurred in
early 1982. It incorporating 44 improvements over its predecessors including a 5%
increase in engine power, and increased payload achieved by increasing the maximum
gross weight  3%. Mark IV retrofit kits and made available to operators at no cost.
Nearly all early SW-24A's are retrofitted to the Mark IV configuration.
Despite this progress, the aircraft's reputation continued to be marred by engine
problems including engine bursts. The resolution of this issue eventually spawned the
other SW-24 models discussed in the subsequent section.
                                                          
1 An Airworthiness Directive or AD is an order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration which mandates that
operators take some kind of action to address a potential safety issue with regards to a particular aircraft model..
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4.2.1.9 Other Descendants
Engine problems experienced with the SW-24 force renewed interest in a re-engined
version of the SW-24 designated the SW-24B. It featured 50% greater engine power
margins for hot climates and high altitude operations as well as 15% in the drive system
power rating. The SW-24B program was announced in 1984 and the received its Type
Certification in 1987. The aircraft gained popularity with the Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) and executive transport market segments.
Several other SW-24 derivatives, also characterized as re-engined versions followed
the SW-24B. The SW-24A+ was a re-engined version of the SW-24A. This engine
retrofit was conducted by an enterprising third party to took advantage of the many SW-
24A models in service. Eventually, this led to a new model the SW-24C, an SW-24B
airframe and drivetrain fitted with more capable versions of the engine initially
introduced in the A+ as a retrofit.
4.2.2 Program Performance Metrics
4.2.2.1 Weight Derived
Based on data compiled from Jane's (ref. 4), the SW-24's empty weight was 7 % over
the initial specification value upon receiving its initial Type Certification. Initially, there
was some confusion regarding what weight empty value to use as a baseline. Jane's
(ref. 4) published several lower empty weights up to the point in time that the aircraft
was actually certified. The earliest reference came from the study phase of the program
and was likely established by simple preliminary design methods and revised. The
second value published seems more creditable since it appears consistently for several
years in Jane's and other publications. Interviews with the lead mass properties
engineer on the program also veirified this value and provided an explanation for some
of the numbers confusion. Equipped weight empty2  values for specific aircraft
                                                          
2 Equipped weight empty refers to an aircraft configured with mission specific equipment such as avionics, safety
equipment.
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configurations corresponding to target markets were tracked internally and sometimes
released. These values were commonly published without noting the specific
configuration they represented. Nearer to the conclusion of this research effort, a copy
of an early internal aircraft specification was discovered, eliminating any final doubts
about the baseline value chosen.
Another observation was noted, the SW-24 spec empty weight represents a more
austere configuration than any of the "launch" customers would operate. This is not an
unusual marketing practice in the aerospace industry and will not impact any
conclusions regarding weight control perfromance as long as the empty weight
definition ramained consistent throughout the program. This issues was discussed with
several of the interviewees, none were aware of mid-stream change in the definition of
empty weight for the SW-24. Their explanation for the situation was that a large market
for a stripped down, single pilot VRF, "no-frills" aircraft was anticipated. However, to
their knowledge, no customer ever purchased such a configuration due to the surplus of
inexpensive used aircraft.  They also verified that a payload shortfall did exist with UK
customers who conducted over-water operations. For these operations, the aircraft
required additional avionics and safety equipment as compared with its US counterpart.
This was the primary reason given for the 3.1 % increase in gross weight  late in the
development program.
Due to the relatively small magnitude of the increase, this change was accomplished
with minimum program and aircraft impact. Structural analyses were revised, a major
effort, but no redesign of the airframe or landing gear of significance was warranted.
Some tests, including landing gear drop tests were repeated at the higher weights.
Over the course of the model's life, this card was played on three additional occasions
with regard to -A models and once with the -B model. In all cases, the motivation was to
recover payload capacity lost to weight growth. Two of the post certification weight
increases with the SW-24A were executed within five years of receiving Type
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certification, and were also accomplished with minimal impact to the airframe and
landing gear.
In closing out this discussion, the useful load of the SW-24 upon Type Certification was
exactly on target, due primarily to the increase in the maximum takeoff gross weight late
in the program.
4.2.2.2 Range
The SW-24 spec design range was intended to be a realistic capability for its operators.
It was based on carrying a full passenger load and fuel with a thirty-minute fuel reserve.
During development this range status value dipped as low as 7.5% below the spec
value, However, it was 1% over specification upon type certification. No specific range
recovery actions could be identified other than a fuel capacity increase of 3%. Queries
regarding this increase attributed it to latent capacity discovered during fuel system
testing and not attributed to a specific redesign.
 As discussed in a prior section, some customers could not achieve the spec, range due
to the additional they were required to carry and the heavier than average passenger
loading.
4.2.2.3 Altitude
The SW-24 exceeded its spec altitude performance by 10% upon receipt of its Type
Certification. There were no specific recollections regarding the program history of this
attribute. However, copies of original attribute tracking charts show that the aircraft's
power margins was tracked to a value 5% higher than the spec value during
development.
4.2.2.4 Frequency of Major Specification Changes
Three major changes to the design of the SW-24 were detected from the examination of
records and publications. An increase in maximum takeoff gross weight, discussed in
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prior section, a reduction in vertical tail area and the change from a variable to a fixed
incidence horizontal tail. In actuality, the initial design had a fixed incidence tail. This
was changed to a variable incidence tail after configuration risk reduction wind tunnel
tests and flight simulation. According to reference 1, this decision was made in part to
reduce the schedule risk associated with such a change introduced mid stream in to a
certification flight test program. If the added capability was not needed the incidence
could be simply fixed. As it turns out, the fixed incidence provided satisfactory handling
qualities to obtain both VFR and IFR type certificates.
4.2.2.5 Program Schedule
First flight of the SW-24 occurred in early months of 1977, nine months later projected
at the program launch. Its initial VFR Type Certification was obtained late in 1979
followed a month later with its  IFR certification. Both dates are six months later than the
original plan. Lastly, the first customer aircraft was delivered in February of 1979,
reflecting an eight month slippage.
4.2.2.6 Flight Test Hours to Obtain Type Certification
Accurate documentation of the number of flight test hours was obtained through a
Swamp Aircraft source. To obtain VRF type certification, four prototype aircraft accrued
1500 flight test hours. To gain IFR certification, an additional 700 hours were flown.
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4.3  M700
4.3.1 General Overview
4.3.1.1 Prelude to M700
Prior to the M700 program launch, Marsh was delivering 150 new aircraft per year on
average, with a peak production rate of 194 for 1987. Figure 4-5 chronicles the actual
deliveries by model for Marsh from 1984 to 2000. Production was split roughly 60% /
40% between the two model lines, with deliveries split 80% / 20% military and civil
customers. In the late 1980's, these numbers were anticipated to fall dramatically in the
coming years as several military contracts were settling. These contracts were the
primary source of revenue for Marsh, and, although potential follow-on upgrade and life
extension US and foreign military contracts were likely, an overall downturn in revenues
was projected.
Figure 4-5: Aircraft Deliveries / Marsh Aircraft
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                       
0
50
100
150
200
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
CALENDAR YEAR
A
IR
CR
A
FT
 D
EL
IV
ER
IE
S
M700
M500
M400/M600
37
 To address this, upgraded versions of two existing models were under development
and early marketing and configuration studies of an aircraft, which led to the Marsh
M700 program, were underway. Due to the post Cold War defense decline, these
initiatives were focused on increasing the civil aircraft business.
Marsh's last foray into developing a new design aircraft occurred in the 1970's. It was a
major military contract that was competed for by two other manufacturers. The contract
award led to a protracted and controversial development program for this aircraft, the
M500. There were many challenges in the areas of handling qualities, systems
integration and reliability. Eventually, the aircraft entered service bringing with it
impressive capabilities not seen in predecessor weapons systems. However, it has
never been able to erase its reputation for being temperamental and unreliable.
The remainder of Marsh's product line traces their origin to a military aircraft developed
in the 1960's. Over the years, this aircraft and its many derivatives became highly
popular with both military and civil users.
4.3.1.2 Initial Plan
The Marsh M700 program was launched early in 1989 with the full support of Marsh's
parent corporation. It was preceded by a year of configuration and market studies. First
flight of the new aircraft was anticipated in 1992 with initial deliveries following within a
year.
The launch announcement was well received, with over one hundred certificates of
interest accrued in the course of one week.
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4.3.1.3 Program Structure
Integrated Product Development Team (IPDT) best describes the configuration of the
M700 program. A customer focus group comprised of potential launch customers from
various market segments also supported the IPDT's during the early definition stages
and at various design reviews.
To reduce the capital outlay for development, risk-sharing partners from North America,
Europe, the Middle East and Asia were recruited to share in the development cost. In
return, these partners would receive a share of the profits from each aircraft sale. Marsh
retained the design of the primary flight systems, systems integration, final assembly
and the delivery of the aircraft. The development of major modules including; the
engines, fuel system, drive systems, main fuselage structure, landing gear, avionics,
interior and furnishing were delegated to these partners.
Figure 4-6: Frequency of New Design Aircraft Introductions / Marsh Aircraft
0
2
4
6
8
10
1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's
DECADE
N
EW
 D
ES
IG
N
 A
IR
CR
A
FT
 I
N
TR
O
D
U
CT
IO
N
S
MARSH AIRCRAFT
39
4.3.1.4 Intellectual Capital
As previously stated, the last bona fide new design Marsh aircraft was the M500 which
was designed during the mid-1970's. In fact, as depicted in Figure 4-6, the frequency at
which new design aircraft introductions in the prior two decades was less than one. The
lowest of the four case study manufacturers. Marsh did however have a knack for
getting the most out of each new design by spawning many derivative models of each.
The sale of Marsh to another concern in 1984, impacted its indigenous intellectual
capital when its engineering and manufacturing operations were moved several
hundred miles inland to an adjacent state. The climate of the new location differed
greatly and many longtime Marsh employees elected not to relocate. Most of the
manufacturing talent was available local to the new site. To fill the voids in the technical
ranks, aggressive recruiting of Marsh competitor workforces was employed.
 At the time of the relocation, Marsh's priorities were (1) move it's existing manufacturing
operations (2) bring the M500 in to rate production and (3) to secure the NGAC (Next
Generation Aircraft) contract. The M700 was still a few years down the road.
When it came time for the M700 program, Marsh again turned to recruiting of Marsh
competitor workforces. Ex-Marsh employees assigned to the M700 program estimated
that 50% of the technical personnel on the program were recruited from outside
companies, including themselves.
4.3.1.5 Tools
The Marsh M700 utilized all of the state of the art design and development tools
including sophisticated a 3D digital CAD/CAM system. Using this system, machined
parts are fabricated by numerical controlled machines directly from the digital data.
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Another feature enabled a three dimensional virtual representation of the aircraft design
to be assembled in whole or in part from a database of CAD files for components and
sub-assemblies. This was utilized to evaluate inferences as well as maintenance access
and vision obstruction. A host of contemporary finite element tools for stress analysis
(NASTRAN) and fluid dynamics codes was utilized as well. An information exchange
network was established so that this digital design and analysis data could be shared
between partners with a minimum of difficulty.
Wind tunnels testing, a more traditional aircraft design tool, were used extensively. A
1/5 scale model tested in the Texas A&M wind tunnel was used to do configuration
validation and development and drag reduction A full-scale test of the main wing was
conducted in one of the NASA wind tunnels.
The MARSH M700 features a unique directional control system that was first introduced
on another model just prior to the M700 launch. The development of this system on this
aircraft led the M700 by several years and contributed greatly to the M700.
4.3.1.6 Type Certification
The MARSH M700 program suffered some delays during its execution, completing
initial VFR certification 12 months later than the original target date. Type Certification
for IFR operations experienced a considerably longer delay of 33 months. This will be
discussed further in a subsequent section.
On a more positive note, one reference claimed that the M700 achieved certification in a
mere 23 months after its maiden flight, the shortest on record for an aircraft of its type.
4.3.1.7 Post Certification Development
The majority of post TC development activity was focused on obtaining IFR type
certification and enhancing the range and single engine capability of the aircraft. This
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work eventually led to an improved -200 version of the aircraft which is discussed briefly
in the subsequent section.
4.3.1.8 MARSH M700 -200
The -200 version of the M700 features an uprated engine and transmissions,
improvements to the air inlets and a gross weight increase. A 7% increase in range and
a 16% increase in payload resulted from these improvements. This model replaced its
predecessor as the standard production configuration. Operators wishing to upgrade
their aircraft to this configuration could buy these kits.
4.3.2 Metrics
4.3.2.1 Weight Derived
The weight metrics baselines were extracted from a technical publication authored by
an MARSH employee early in the development program.   They seem quire optimistic,
and yield high weight metric variances (ref Table _). Putting the variance magnitudes
aside, the constant creep of MARSH M700's weight empty and maximum takeoff gross
weight indicate that the program had difficulty with weigh control. Four published
maximum takeoff gross weights were found in a variety of publications prior to receiving
its initial VFR type certification. A fifth followed as the aircraft received IFR certification.
Clearly, the increments were aimed at delivering an acceptable useful load for its
customers.
4.3.2.2 Range
The MARSH M700 suffered a continuous decline in range performance throughout its
development. As envisioned, the aircraft maximum takeoff gross weight would be
reached with a full tank of fuel and the advertised payload. However, as its weight
escalated, the full payload and fuel could not be carried simultaneously. Due to
geometric constraints imposed by its configuration, enlarging the fuel system of the
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M700 proved difficult and only increased slightly over the duration of the development
program.
The shortfall of its range performance led to its demise in one of its primary markets. In
fact, the launch customer for the aircraft cancelled its option for further aircraft due to
the range shortfall.
4.3.2.3 Altitude
The altitude performance for the MARSH M700 exceeded the original specification by
10%. An increase in engine and gearbox ratings was effective in countering detrimental
impact of the aircraft's weight escalation during development.
4.3.2.4 Frequency of Major Specification Changes
Twelve major specification changes were identified for the M700 by examining
published documents As previously discussed, the maximum takeoff gross weight of the
Marsh M700 was increased five times. The actual impact to the development cost and
schedule could not be quantified, although it is known that no changes were required to
the aircraft for the last increase.
Other major changes allocated to this case include increases in both the engine and
transmission ratings, a redesign of the electrical system, widening the fuselage 4" and
the shortfalls in range and payload performance.
4.3.2.5 Schedule
As noted in Table 4 the schedule variance to achieve initial type certification was 12
months. Not entirely too bad for this industry. However, a much more serious delay of
33 months was encountered in obtaining IFR certification.
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It is typical for aircraft in this class to obtain VFR certification first, deliver a few aircraft
to customers to start the process of training its pilots and mechanics. Within three to six
months the IFR certification is expected with little difficulty.
In the case of the M700, the basic electrical system did not meet the certification criteria
for redundancy and had to be redesigned. In addition, the unique directional control
system of the M700 was not architecturally compatible with existing automatic flight
control systems offered by the chosen vendor. Thus, it required a significant redesign
and several iterations to arrive at a certifiable solution. This clearly reflects on the lack of
prior experience with IFR certification of civil aircraft.
Also of note, the M700's IFR type certification was sub-contracted to the automatic flight
controls system manufacturer. This is a unique situation with respect to the other case
studies.
4.3.2.6 Flight Test Hours to Obtain Type Certification
Three development M700's shared the type certification duties. Initial VFR Type
Certification was achieved within 23 months after its maiden flight. It is estimated from
literature that these aircraft collectively logged approximately 3,000 flight in reaching this
milestone.
 As mentioned in the prior section, a third party conducted the IFR certification of the
M700. No published data or other sources could be found to establish the flight test
hours required for the M700 to obtain an IFR type certification.
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4.3.2.7 Summary
Table Table 4  provides a summary of the performance metrics at the M700s initial VFR
type certification.
Table 4: MARSH M700 Metric Variance Summary
Metric Deviation
We +36 %
Useful Load  -18 %
Payload -28 %
MTOGW  +11 %
Range  -22 %
Fuel  +8 %
HOGE +10 %
First Flight +9 mo.
Type Certification (VFR) +12 mo.
Type Certification (IFR) +33 mo.
Initial Delivery +12 mo.
Flight Test hours to TC 3,000 hrs.
Major Specification Changes 12
Further discussion regarding the metric values assigned are contained in the prior
sections.
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4.4 SWAMP SW-40
4.4.1 Overview
4.4.1.1 Early History
The SW-40 first appears in publications in the early 1990's. Initially the emphasis of the
program and corresponding aircraft design was to capture a DoD contract for a multi-
mission aircraft. At this early stage in the program, the aircraft was a direct derivative of
the SW-18, an aircraft already in widespread service with the US and foreign militaries.
This strategy was adopted to capitalize on cost effectiveness of procuring a high
commonality derivative of an incumbent DoD aircraft as opposed to a new design
model3. A civil variant was to be derived from the military model, which bode well with
the "dual use" philosophy emerging at the time.4 While a compelling case, the DoD
procurement program was cancelled amidst a myriad of political turmoil.
After this, there was a period of internal deliberation as to the viability of such a program
without the support of the US DoD. During this interval, the program was throttled back
while the program direction vacillated back and forth from a DoD spec. aircraft to a pure
Civil/FAA certified aircraft. Eventually, a new vision of the SW-40 program and aircraft
emerged. It was externally similar to its predecessor, but based on significantly different
assumptions.
This new vision was based on certification of the aircraft to the latest FAA/JAA
airworthiness regulations. To enhance the aircraft's appeal to potential military
customers, selected systems would be designed to meet more stringent military
requirements.5 The low cost argument, previously based on commonality with the SW-
                                                          
3 The basis of this argument revolved around network  externalities such as pilot and maintenance training, and an
established logistics system and procurement efficiency.
4 The term "dual use" describes the philosophy where military technology is used for civil applications and vice
versa.
5 A large percentage of the projected international market for this class of aircraft was projected to be foreign
militaries who were in need of replacing their older obsolete fleets.
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18, shifted to achieving the lowest operating cost in its class. When the preliminary
design studies for the aircraft were repeated to these criteria, it was recognized that
these objectives could only be accomplished with a new design aircraft. Hence, the
derivative aircraft approach was quietly abandoned. With ambitions of capturing future
predecessor aircraft upgrades, certain aspects of the SW-40's subsystem architectures
was constrained to enhance their future retrofit-ability to the large fleet of SW-18 aircraft
and its derivative.
The revised program business plan for the SW-40 was now based on an internally
funded program which, in the worst case scenario, would sell several hundred aircraft,
the optimistic scenario, an order of magnitude more. To reduce its own development
cash outlays, five international risk-sharing partners were solicited to share in the
development cost of major aircraft modules. In return, the profit from aircraft sales is
shared with these partners.
The officially launch of the SW-40 program was announced at a major international air
show in the mid-1990's. At that time the expected date of first flight was mid-1998 with
Type Certification and aircraft deliveries by early 2000.  For the purposes of this
research, the performance of the SW-40 is benchmarked against this "Second Coming"
as it meets the criteria new design aircraft criteria. Documentation which preceded this
period was not utilized to establishing performance metrics.
4.4.1.2 Business Climate
Since starting production, SW-18 and derivatives thereof have been the primary
revenue-generating product for Swamp. As depicted in Figure 2-1, SW-18 deliveries to
US and foreign militaries during the 1980's averaged 120 to 150 aircraft per year with
peaks as high as 172. In the early 1990's, DoD deliveries of these aircraft as well as the
SW-28 started to fall as contracts were fulfilled and defense funding dropped due to the
demise of the "Cold War". The SW-24 also contributed 10 to 12 aircraft per year.
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In the near term, DoD deliveries of the advanced SW-38 were scheduled to commence
in 1996. This combined with SW-40 sales and increased foreign sales of SW-18 models
were anticipated to offset the declining DoD sales of the SW-18 and -28. However,
lacking adequate budget and political support, the SW-38 program slipped continuously
during the 1990's, delaying expected revenues from this program. This in turn impacted
the funding available for SW-40 development since a large percentage of the
development funding was derived from US government IR&D funds. 6
Figure 4-7: Annual Aircraft Deliveries / Swamp Aircraft
4.4.1.3 Program Structure
The SW-40 Program structure conforms to the Integrated Product Development Team
(IPDT) model which became popular in the 1990's. The program staff and IPDT's were
                                                          
6 IR&D is an acronym for Independent Research and Development. The funds are provided to US government
contractors based on a fixed percentage of contract valuation.
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collocated in one area of Swamp's engineering department. The IPDT's were organized
according to the partner aircraft modules; which in this context includes modules to be
designed and manufactured by Swamp and the aircraft assembly. There was also
System Integration IPDT that coordinated communication with the partners and
Attributes IPDT responsible for ensuring that the aircraft performance objectives were
met. The IPDT leads were typically engineers with at least ten years of design and
development experience with derivatives of in production legacy models. The IPDT's
were staffed from the various functional engineering groups. The majority of the IPDT
leads and their staff had no prior experience with the design and development of a
"clean sheet" aircraft. Initially, all of the IPDT leads severed ties with their respective
functional organizations and became direct reports to the program. This relationship
proved undesirable over time and was replaced by a temporary assignment status. This
avoided putting experienced and valued personnel at risk during periods of
"downsizing". Reportedly, some managers did not fully cooperated with the collocation
decree in order to maintain control over their staff. According to some of the sources
interviewed, these situations weakened IPDT philosophy.
 The program staff consisted of a Program Vice President, Program Manager, Chief of
Design, Business Manager, Partner Manager as well as few other staff positions. The
SW-40 Program VP reported directly to the CEO. The program did not have the
traditional Program Engineering Manager or a strong Engineering oversight function.
Similarly, there was no official marketing representation until the later stages of the
program. The Program VP, company CEO and deputy VP's shared in the marketing
duties to fill this void.
4.4.1.4 Intellectual Capital
Figure 4-8presents Swamp's frequency of new aircraft introduction. Of all of the case
study manufacturers featured in this research, Swamp has rate of new aircraft
introductions in every decade. However, in the decade preceding the S-40, new aircraft
introductions were just 2. For the 1990's, the only other new aircraft introduced other
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than the SW-40 was the SW-38. According to sources, due to several factors, the SW-
38 experience has not been a great benefit to the SW-40 program in terms of
intellectual capital. The aircraft designs being quite different in terms of configuration,
level of technology and intended use. The SW-38 program is housed in a separate,
autonomous facility in an adjacent town. Migration of personnel between these two
programs was minimal due to the scarcity of resources and the resulting protectionist
attitudes of both programs. And lastly, as quasi-concurrent programs, their program
schedules were not  favorable to any significant migration or resource sharing.
Figure 4-8: Frequency of New Design Aircraft Introductions
At the program level, the SW-24 leadership all had distinguished records of service
within Swamp. Though, it was heavily weighted towards legacy programs with little or
no prior experience with new design aircraft development. In addition, none had
backgrounds with any significant flight science exposure..
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Staffing levels during the development experienced peaks and valleys but were
generally characterized by persons interviewed as "under staffed". This is corroborated
by consecutive years where the program under spent their budgets and the frequent
schedule slippage.
Many former NUAC / SW-24 "key players" were still employed at Swamp when the SW-
40 was launched and the earlier program years. Most of these personnel held
middle/upper level manager positions, including the CEO, several VP's and functional
engineering directors or were prominent engineering technical specialists. Many of
these individuals were offered early retirement incentive packages during the mid to
later 1990's to help achieve the company's downsizing plan. Few,  if any were still
employed at Swamp by the time the aircraft embarked on its maiden flight.
4.4.1.5 Tools
The SW-40 utilized all of the state of the art design and development tools including a
sophisticated 3D digital CAD/CAM system called CATIA. This system was first
introduced on a large scale with great success on the SW-38 program.  Using this
system, machined parts are fabricated by numerical controlled machines directly from
the digital data. Another feature enabled a three dimensional virtual representation of
the aircraft design to be assembled in whole or in part from a database of CAD files of
components and sub-assemblies. This was utilized to evaluate inferences as well as
maintenance access and vision obstruction. This referred to as the DMU, or digital
mock-up. A host of finite element tools for modal analysis, stress analysis (NASTRAN)
and fluid dynamics codes were utilized as well. An International Wide Area network
(IWAN) was established to enable the exchange of this digital design and analysis data
with the risk-sharing partners over satellite links.
One fifth and one sixth wind tunnel tests were conducted to validate the early
configuration and develop the basic data used to construct a flight simulation models.
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The relative use of wind tunnels was described as less than the SW-24 program and
about equivalent to the SW-18 program.
Many hours of full-scale test development flight test data were accrued on the SW-40
main wing using an SW-18 flight test aircraft as a surrogate SW-40. The flight test
version of the wing of the wing was shorter in span with respect to the actual SW-40
wing.
4.4.1.6 Flight Testing and Development
The first flight of the SW-40 occurred near the close of 1998 calendar year, twenty-one
months later than the original scheduled date. While the maiden flight went well, the
aircraft flew significantly more nose up than was predicted or would be acceptable for
achieve type certification. Subsequent flights also revealed the aircraft to have marginal
longitudinal stability at some CG's and excessive control system actuator and horizontal
tail loads during some flight regimes.
Over the next year and one half, the SW-40 team focused on resolving these issues.
This entailed many diagnostic flights with the baseline configuration eventually leading
to the fabrication and flight testing of many development-only empennage
configurations. These tail configurations were crudely fabricated and attached to
expedite the completion of the evaluation of the candidate configurations. A total of 8
iterations were accounted for from research. Changes to the main wing and vertical tail
were also evaluated.
Eventually a series of configurations changes were agreed upon which satisfactorily
addressed the certification issues at hand. These included; a fuselage stretch,
relocation of the horizontal tail from the top of the vertical tail to its base, shortening of
the vertical tail and a migration and narrowing of the CG range. Parts were redesigned
for increased strength where excessive loads were experienced.
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Due to the extensive changes required to update two of the five development aircraft to
this configuration, certification flight-testing was further delayed until early 2001, when
the first flight of SW-40, aircraft number 5 took place.
53
4.4.2 Metrics
4.4.2.1 Weight Data
As with the SW-24, Swamp employed the use of a PVP (ref. Appendix A) to counter
weight growth on the SW-40 during design and development. Figure 4-9 presents a
summary of the programs weight history from program launch through type certification.
As can be seen from this chart, the weight control for the first 20 months was initially
successful with the status weight below the spec weight value. However, beyond this
point the aircraft status weight and the spec value escalates and never fully quite
recovers. At the right side of the chart, where the data terminates, the We spec
deviation is 11 %.
Figure 4-9: SW-40 / We Status During Design and Development
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To offset the steady weight escalation and preserve useful load, the maximum takeoff
gross weight was increased 4 times during the design and development phase. This
was an effective strategy for recovering useful load at the expense of the budget and
schedule required to reanalyze the design at the increased weight and to redesign low
margin parts. A maximum takeoff weight variance of +10.3% and a useful load variance
of +7.9% are calculated from published data which was closest to the SW-40's TC date.
4.4.2.2 Range Performance
The initial range specification for the SW-40 is identical to its predecessor, the SW-24. It
is derived from the same basic civil version operating with a full passenger load with
adequate fuel for two alternate landing locations. As an important customer and design
attribute, the range status was reported is on a weekly basis. On several occasions
during the program development, the range status declined below the spec target. The
most prevalent range countermeasure applied during the program to recover the range
was to increase the fuel system capacity, which was implemented on three occasions.
Driven primarily by weight escalation, the first redesign, which occurred within about
one year after T0, increased the fuel capacity 7%. Since the fuel tanks are not carried in
a wing structure, the supporting airframe structure required reanalysis and redesign to
comply with certification criteria for flight and crashworthiness.7 Software for the Aircraft
Systems Computer and a few other more trivial areas were impacted also. At this time,
no hard tooling had been fabricated or any fuel system qualification testing conducted
and as such there was no impact to these areas. Personnel interviewed, who were
knowledgeable of these events, agreed that these changes caused adverse impact to
the program schedule and budget. However, due to the simultaneous interaction other
issues, which also impacted the program schedule and budget, none were comfortable
in estimating the impact of these changes.
                                                          
7 Aircraft with wing mounted fuel tanks generally can increase their fuel capacity with minimal impact to airframe
structure provided the added tankage is in the wing also.
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Two years later in the program, further weight and drag increases reduced single
engine performance and range to just below the spec value again. A change to a more
powerful, but less fuel efficient engine was an effective remedy for the single engine
performance but hurt range performance further, prompting another redesign of the fuel
tanks to increase their capacity another 8 %. The impact was broader than the first
redesign since it impacted the supplier subcontracted to supply the fuel tanks. The
detail design tank as well as some risk reduction testing of the crashworthy bladder had
previously been started. Some renegotiations with the supplier were required to cover
these changes.
The last redesign to increase the fuel capacity was driven weight and drag increases,
this time resulting from changes to the aircraft fuselage length and empennage
configuration. This iteration increased the fuel capacity another 8.5% requiring the
redesign of the fuel bladder, fuel gauging and venting system. Reanalysis fuel tank
support structure and the potential requirement to conduct another round of fuel bladder
and tank drop testing. As with the prior changes, there was clearly budget and schedule
impacts resulting from this redesign effort, but no reliable means of estimating them.
In summary, the SW-40 team was effective at meeting their range specification through
a series of fuel capacity increases, which accrued to a 26% increase in its capacity over
the baseline spec value. However, these changes adversely impacted the program's
and subcontractors schedule and budget.
4.4.2.3 Altitude Performance
The altitude specification set forth at the outset of the program was based on
performance with full fuel and passengers.  The most current projection of this capability
at Type Certification is a shortfall of 26.5%. As with the single engine performance,
some of the lost performance was recovered by the 5% increase available power made
possible with a switch to a more powerful engine. These changes were accomplished
with relatively little impact to the design, schedule and budget. The more powerful
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engine was a planned option for introduction later in the program and the transmission
rating increase was a previously established contingency plan. Some schedule impact
resulted from the engine development schedule which did not coincide with the first
flight, type Certification and production start up dates. In fact, the first two test aircraft
did not receive these engines but the less powerful version.
4.4.2.4 Schedule
Based on the  was the date established when the program was officially launched with
the blessing of Swamp's corporate parent in mid 1995. The Type Certification schedule
deviation is projected to be 48 months. Some lost schdule  is expected to be recovered
between TC and the first aircraft delivery, with the schedule deviation of +44 months.
4.4.2.5 Major Specification Changes
Fourteen major specifications changes were gleaned from various aviation industry
references as well as internal sources. The majority of these changes have been
introduced in prior sections. Four of the fourteen changes are attributed to increases to
the maximum takeoff gross weight of the aircraft, cumulatively totaling 10.3% over the
original design specification. Another four to design changes identified as a result of
issues identified during early flight testing; empennage design changes, fuselage stretch
and wing relocation. Three are attributed to fuel tankage redesigns that yielded a 26%
increase in capacity. And, two by performance requirements; a change to a more
powerful engine and a drive system rating increase.
The last change is not discussed in the prior sections, a complete redesign of the
aircraft's avionics system. This is a somewhat gray item, especially in context to the
disco era programs, which were equipped primarily with non-integrated mix of electro-
mechanical systems. The MS era aircraft are both equipped with "glass cockpits" based
on integrated digital based systems. For these aircraft, abandoning a relatively complete
and mature avionics system design is costly.
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Reportedly, there were several issues, which contributed to this late change with two
emerging as the primary drivers. Business issues related to industry consolidation and
downsizing within the aerospace industry can characterize the secondary issues.  The
first of the primary issues was negative customer feedback of initial SW-40 avionics
system. Simply stated, the majority of the potential SW-40 customers had pre-existing
relationships with another major avionics manufacturer and had, to a large degree
standardized their aircraft fleet on this manufacturer's systems. While not well
understood at the outset of the program, this loyalty was based on more than
preference, having business and safety dimensions. Standardization reduces the
amount of training required for both the pilots and maintainers and the amount of spares
required in context to having a multitude of systems. Safety is enhanced by reducing the
probability of a pilot reacting incorrectly in a critical situation due to a misinterpretation of
information rooted in a differing display convention used by another manufacturer.
The second major issue was the lack of system modularity, which would made it
difficulty to upgrading or add popular features and/or options not present within the
basic system.
While this discussion certainly has some strong technology dimensions, it is
fundamentally a case where the manufacturer had a weak understanding of its
customer. The fact that the disco era aircraft did not have systems of such complexity is
a moot point, thus I have I am including in the total. It also meets the visibility criteria, as
it is a change that is detectable to the industry press. Some of the changes that are
discussed in prior text did not meet this criteria and therefore are not included in this
tally.
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4.4.2.6 SW-40 Performance At Type Certification 8
Table 5: SW-40 Metric Variance Summary
Initial Specs: Deviation
We +12%
Useful Load +7.9
MTOGW +10.3%
We/MTOGW +1.44%
Range +7.5%
HOGE -26.5%
First Flight +21mo.
Type Certification (projected) +48 mo.
Initial Delivery +44 mo.
Major Specification Changes 14
                                                          
8 The SW-40 had not obtained Type Certification. These metrics are based on the latest available data at that just
prior to the publication of this research.
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4.5 Case Study Metric Summary
Table 6: Case Study Metric Variance Summary
Design Attribute Metrics: B140 SW-24 M700 SW-40
We 21% 7% 36% 12%
Useful Load 14% 2% 6% 10%
payload 16% 3% -18% 7%
MTOGW 18% 3% 11% 10%
Range -30% 1% -22% 8%
Altitude -36% 22% 9% -27%
Program Performance Metrics:
First Flight 8 9 9 21
Type Certification (VFR) 11 6 12 48
Type Certification (IFR) 17 8 33 48
Initial Delivery 10 8 12 44
Design Maturity Metrics:
Specification Changes 9 2 12 15
Flight Test Hours 3000 1500 1800
Intellectual Capital Metrics:
New Design Introductions, prior 10 yrs. 3 5 1 2
New Design Introductions, prior 20 yrs. 9 11 5 8
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Program Ranking
5.1.1 Metrics
To make the relative performances of the subject programs clearer, a simple ranking
technique based scale of  0 to 100 was applied. For each metric category, the high
score of 100 was assigned to the "best in class" performance and a zero to the "worst in
class". The intermediate scores were determined by linear interpolation these extremes.
Table 6 presents the summarized results of this ranking.
The tallied score for each program, provided at the base of each column, is simply the
arithmetic sum of the metric scores. These scores are not intended to be the end of this
story but a means of providing direction to useful in understanding the relative
performance of these programs but not the end of the story. A more "balanced
scorecard" could be attained by eliminating some of the overlapping metrics.
61
Table 7: Scored Case Study Metric Comparisons
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    
    
    
    
    
    
B140 SW-24 M700 SW-40 DISCO MS
Design Attribute Metrics:
We 52 100 0 83 76 41
Useful Load 100 0 33 69 50 51
payload 100 62 0 74 81 37
MTOGW 0 100 47 51 50 49
Range 0 83 21 100 41 61
Altitude 0 100 78 16 50 47
Subtotal Scores:252 444 179 393 348 286
Program Performance Metrics:
First Flight 100 92 92 0 96 46
TC (VFR) 88 100 86 0 94 43
TC (IFR) 78 100 38 0 89 19
Initial Delivery 94 100 89 0 97 44
Subtotal Scores:360 392 304 0 376 152
Design Maturity Metrics:
Specification Changes 46 100 23 0 73 12
Flight Test Hours
Subtotal Scores:46 100 23 0 73 12
Aggregate Score Totals =>> 658 937 506 393 797 450
Intellectual Capital Metrics:
New Design Aircraft, Prior 10 years 50 100 0 25 75 13
New Design Aircraft, Prior 20 years 67 100 0 50 83 25
Subtotal Scores:117 200 0 75 158 38
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5.1.2 Intellectual Capital
Figure 5-1 presents a summary of the frequency of new aircraft introductions for all
three case study manufacturers. Each individual set of data has been previously
presented along with each of the respective case studies in section 4. The Intellectual
Capital metrics presented in Table 7 and Figure 5-1 have been derived from the same
set of data. However, predecessor decades in Table 7 are referenced to the program
launch dates and not calendar decades.
Figure 5-1: Frequency of New Aircraft Introductions / All
The calendar reference employed in Figure 5-1 and its predecessors were derived from
the RAND study (ref 1) in order to facilitate comparisons with industry wide data
presented in this research. Such a comparison is presented in Figure 5-2. In order to
accommodate the differing order of magnitudes of the manufacturer and industry level
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
            
            
            
            
           
           
           
           
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
           
           
          
          
0
2
4
6
8
10
1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's
DECADE
N
EW
 D
ES
IG
N
 A
IR
CR
A
FT
 I
N
TR
O
D
U
CT
IO
N
S      SWAMP AIRCRAFT
    
BUSH AIRCRAFT
MARSH AIRCRAFT
DISCO 
ERA
MICROSOFT 
ERA
20 yr.
63
data, the data is presented with semi-logarithmic format. Conveniently, this technique
also exposes the exponential nature of these trends and again illustrates the similarity
of the decay rates of the case study manufacturers and aerospace industry as a whole.
Figure 5-2: Comparison / New Design Aircraft Introduction Decay Rates
5.2 Intra-Era Comparisons
5.2.1 Disco Era; SW-24 and BA140
The two disco era aircraft are somewhat linked in history, even aside from the
comparisons made in this study. Both aircraft were designed to capture the same
customer base and in some respects influenced each other in terms of their aggressive
design/development schedules and their introductions in to service. Both aircraft
represented firsts for their respective manufacturers, as they were the first aircraft
produced exclusively for a commercial market using only corporate financing. Put
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another way, they were the first aircraft that were not spawned from major US military
DoD contract.
With regards to this work and the metrics established for comparison, the disco era
programs are most similar in the areas of intellectual capital, program performance and
specification changes with both aircraft bettering their disco era counterparts. In terms
of design attribute metrics, the SW-24 program, as well as one of the MS era programs
performed significantly better than the BA140 program. However, the intra-era ranking
correlates with the IC metrics, with the better performance going to the SW-24 program
with more IC depth in terms of new design aircraft introduction in the prior decades.
Looking in to this issue further, there were three new design aircraft Bush introduced in
the prior decade. For two of these programs, the BA70 and BA100 the development
activity is on the far side of the prior decade. The remaining aircraft, the XBA135, a
prototype aircraft of which three were produced, did not progress beyond the prototype
phase, as the contract was awarded to a competitor. It is certain that these prototype
aircraft did not attain the same level of maturity as a production aircraft. Often in the
case of prototype aircraft competing for a major DoD contract, some latitude is given to
the prime contractor(s) in terms of "bookkeeping" a level of performance that cannot be
demonstrated by the actual prototype aircraft. This is to account for compromises in
materials and technology made to expedite the construction of the prototype aircraft.
The prime contractor must have a convincing story as to how this capability will be
achieved on the production version of the aircraft.
 A simplistic example of this would be the substitution of plate steel for the prototype
aircraft in lieu forged titanium for the production wing attachment fittings. This expedites
the development and reduces the cost by avoiding a wait for long lead-time titanium
forgings.  The deviations incurred by these compromises and their impact on various
performance parameters are tracked so that the performance of the actual production
aircraft can be derived from the prototype aircraft performance. In a highly competitive
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DoD contract, these corrections can be significant and with the rationale often bordering
on "smoke and mirrors".
Without the experience of transitioning the XBA135 prototypes into rate production
deliveries of 10 compliant BA135 aircraft per month, a segment of the Bush workforce is
left with an experience void with respect to the winning prime contractor.
Not included in the IC metrics was the XBA120 aircraft, which succeeded the BA140
program by a slight margin. According to interviews, the design and development
activity period for this experimental research aircraft overlapped that of the BA140.
However, in addition to the issues discussed in the context of the XBA135 program,
XBA120's research focus, and physical and technological separation prevented it from
providing any significant benefit to the BA140 program.
Swamp's predecessor aircraft are also weighted towards experimental aircraft program
with 3 of the 5 aircraft being experimental research aircraft.  However, two of the
programs were aircraft that achieved rate production with the S-24 following closely on
the coat tails of one of those programs. The freshness of the lessons learned from this
predecessor program was cited as a vital element in the success of the SW-24 program
on multiple occasions during interviews. This is discussed further in subsequent
sections.
In summary, the implications introduced by these observations are that; the design,
development and manufacture a limited build prototype aircraft may exclude of de-
emphasize important experiences necessary to ensure a successful transition a new
aircraft design in to rate production.  And, the more recent the experience is, the more
likely it is to benefit the successor program.
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5.2.2 MS Era; M700 and SW-40
As with their disco era counterparts, both the MS era aircraft programs were developed
with corporate financing on speculation that there was sufficient demand for these
aircraft within the worldwide civil aviation market. This was a first such endeavor for
Marsh aircraft and the second for Swamp aircraft. However, based on articles published
in the aviation press, both manufacturers were very hopeful of landing some kind of
DoD contract award.
With regards to this work and the metrics established for comparison, the MS era
programs are most similar in the areas of intellectual capital, program performance and
specification changes as both aircraft rank third and fourth in these categories. In terms
of design attribute metrics, the SW-40 program rank is much closer to the SW-24 than it
is to the M700, which has the lowest ranking in this arena. However, as with the disco
era programs, the intra-era ranking correlates with the IC metrics, with the better
performance going to the SW-40 program with more IC depth in terms of new design
aircraft introduction in the prior decades.
The intra-era ranking for frequency of specification changes is consistent with the IC
metrics from a simple 1-4 ranking perspective. However, the SW-40 is really in a class
by itself, capturing the lowest rank by a considerable margin. As described in section 4,
this program has the most ambiguous program start date as it experienced at least one
clear "false start" and arguably a couple of "quasi false starts".
5.2.3 Disco Era vs. MS Era
Based on the averaged Disco and MS era scores tabulated in the far right columns of
Table 7, there is a consistent pattern of ranking, with the Disco era programs scoring
the highest all metric categories, design attribute, program performance and design
maturity. At the subcategory levels, the disco era outscore the MS era with exception of
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range. Arguably, the scores for useful load, MTOGW and altitude could be considered a
tie.
The program with the highest frequency of "best in class" scores is the SW-24 program.
Ironically, the program with the highest frequency of "worst in class" scores is the SW-
40 program. This issue is explored further in the subsequent section.
5.2.4 Comparison of SW-24 and SW-40
In nearly all categories, the SW-24 performance exceeds that of the SW-40. Interviews
of current and former Swamp employees who contributed to both of these programs
provided valuable insight into understanding this performance differential. Consistently,
the NUAC program, which preceed the SW-24 played an important role of the
interviewee's explanation of this performance differential. In short, during the later
phases of the NUAC program, Swamp Aircraft and Big Valley Aircraft were competing
against each other for the aircraft that would replace the thousands Bush B50 aircraft in
US DoD service. For the first year and a half of flight testing Swamp's XSW-18
prototypes were performing far below expectation. They were overweight, and did not
meet the speed, payload and perfromance objectives. In addition, severe vibration and
low speed handling qualities problems limited the amount of useful flight testing that
could be conducted. Little progress was made until a shift in program management
towards individuals with stronger flight sciences and aircraft technologies backgrounds.
As the story goes, within six months the severe vibration problem was solved by
changes in the wing and the low speed handling problem were solved by replacing the
fixed horizontal tail with a stabilator. These changes alone also improved of the
perfromance attributes which were in turn further improved by focused weight and drag
reduction activities. In the end, Swamp's XSW-18 outperfromed its Big Valley
counterpart, the XBV-179, by a significant weight and performance margin and was
awarded the NUAC contract. The dramatic end of this story is standard Swamp Aircraft
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lore. However, the details of the SW-18X's poor performance in the early phases and
the steps taken to resolve the technical issues is relatively unknown.
Despite this great victory, some within Swamp realized that many of the problems
encountered with the initial NUAC prototypes could have been avoided and that steps
should be taken to prempt such problem in the future. Local "Lessons Learned" data
bases were created to capture this knowledge. The database included not only NUAC
lessons but from other programs as well. The effort was championed by Swamp's
engineering management team.
Figure 5-3: Swamp SW-24 and SW-40 Weight  Growth Profiles
The SW-24 program, following on the coat tails of NUAC was the greatest benefactor of
this period of reflection and freshly Xeroxed documents resulting from it. While it is not
the intent to expand the scope to include all the the NUAC lessons learned, ones that
which potentially impacted the perfromance metrics are discussed.
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As presented in their respective sections, both the SW-24 and SW-40 utilized the same
PVP methodology to control aircraft weight growth. As evident from Table 7, the SW-24
weight control was quite good through its initial type certification and "best in class"
among its case study counterparts. One of the subjects interviewed stated that the
program manager, and later the VP of Engineering, enforced a "pound in pound out
mandate." He further explained that, if it was concluded that one pound needed to be
added to a particular system or component on the aircraft, a pound which can be
removed must be found somehere else in the aircraft. He also recollected that this
program manager strongly believed that the overall health of an aircraft development
program was reflected in weight status charts.  Historically, this view is shared by
military procurement agencies which universally use weight as a primary program help
metric.
For comparison purposes, the lifetime weight growth of these two aircraft is presented in
Figure 5-3. Included is the design and development wieght status for both models and
the specification weight for production SW-24 and subsequent derivative models. The
time lines are baselined to their respective program launch dates.
Initail impressions of this comparison by colleagues has consistently generated similar
responses, "they look about the same." The status weights of both aircraft fluxuate at or
below the spec weight for 30 months or so and then begins to climb. For the SW-24, the
weight gain starts a few months prior to type certification, continues steadily in response
to design is modified to eliminate aircraft problems identified during field use. The
weight stabilizes with the introduction of the MkIV model and stair steps with each
successive derivative model. This, according to one of the Swamp weight engineers
interviewed, is a "classic" lifetime weight growth history.
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The major discriminator between the SW-24 and the SW-40 weight growth trends is that
the SW-24's achieved type certification within the left hand portion of the weight trend
where there exists strong weight control and the weight is relatively stable. Its weight
does not start to climb until the aircraft enters production when the weight control effort
is significantly reduced or non-existent. In contrast, the SW-40, with the same alleged
weight control methodology, is quite good for the initial 20-30 months, when it steadily
climbs at a rate of a production aircraft.
Figure 5-4: SW-40 / Official Program Empty Weight History During Design &
Development
The SW-40 empty weight status, also plotted in Figure 5-3, starts off well but starts to
faulter in the 20-30 month range. Beyond that its weight growth is similar to that of the
post TC SW-24. When queried about the general effectiveness of the SW-40 weight
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control , weight engineers consistently complained that program management would not
support an aggressive weight control program early in the program when it would be
most effective. This reluctance, in their opinion, was rooted in program staffing/funding
constraints. It should be noted that these responses were referenced to their own
internal weight status charts which are not presented in terms of percent and are
referenced to spec empty weight. Figure 5-4, although still presented in terms of
percent, represents Swamp's internal accounting of the SW-40's weight variance
through the program.  In reviewing this chart, one would agree that the weight control
was not perfect, but reasonably good by industry standards. In fact, a +3% weight
variance at type certification would be ranked in the top 30th percentile with respect to
weight control compared with Army aircraft programs of the same type over the past 30
years (ref. Figure 5-5).
Figure 5-5: Weight Empty Variance from Initial Specification versus Percentile Ranking
for DoD Aircraft of the Same Type
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In contrast, Figure 5-6 is constructed from the same set of weight status data, re-
referenced to the SW-40 initial specification weight empty as are the We variance
metrics described in Section 3 and summarized in Table 6. The weight deviation peaks
at 12.5% and closes out at  11.6%. at the 100 month mark. Again, referencing Figure
5-5 this is a relatively poor, lower 2 percentile performance. Also depicted is the We
spec value which has increased four times for a total of 8%.
In electing to status the weight empty PVP in terms of weight empty delta instead of
actual weight empty, the cumulative impact of spec revisions to the weight empty are
lost to an audience of managers viewing the chart.  Considering program managers
come and go during the duration of such a project, it is unlikely that today's program
manager can possibly grasp the full context of situation.
Figure 5-6: SW-40 Empty Weight History Referenced to Initial Spec Value
-8%
-4%
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96
Months from Program Launch
W
e 
Va
ri
an
ce
 f
ro
m
 O
ri
gi
na
l S
pe
c 
(%
)
PVP indexed to 
initial We spec
Status based on 
initial spec value
We spec value
73
 An aerodynamacist who participated in both the SW-24 and SW-40 programs pointed
out that the use of PVP's was not limited to weight, but were also developed and utilized
to improve the probability of meeting other important SW-24 aircraft attributes such as
range, cruise speed, and rate of climb. This is supported by markings on some of
perfromance attribute tracking charts obtained from other sources.  This approach was
not adopted for the SW-40 and the interviewee felt that the program could have
benefited from this approach.
This person also recited specific NUAC lessons learned that were adopted a design
rules and employed on the SW-24 program to ensure performance goals were met.
They were:
• The final aircraft fuselage outer mold lines (OML) or fuselage shape
must be windtunnel and hover stand tested to ensure that drag
assessments are correct and wake interactions are understood.
• Analytical models used to predict performance must take advantage of
the most up to date codes and be properly correlated utilizing
windtunnel  data.
• Any new design  wing system must be undergo a full scale wind tunnel
testing.
The SW-24 programs compliance with these three NUAC lessons Learned is well
documented in several technical papers presented at industry conferences and
published in several industry technical journals The extensive analysis and wind tunnel
testing efforts required significantly greater front end staffing than NUAC. This was
described by the interviewee in the following manner, "the SW-24 had half an aero
department working on it." In contrast, the NUAC staffing was described as "one aero
guy who was "thrown off" the program for not being success oriented."
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In comparison, the SW-40 program conducted more windtunnel testing than NUAC, but
less than the SW-24 program. On fifth and one sixth wind tunnel models representing a
very early SW-40 configuration was tested. The sortened version of the wing on a SW-
18 flight test vehicle.
According to interviews, a risk reduction program of  scale model testing and analysis
was proposed for the SW-40 but was nixed due to budget constraints. The staffing level
for the SW-40 rarely exceeded that of one man which meant that the aerodynamacist
was consistently overwhelmed by the amount of work at any given point in time. As
such , work is done to a shallow level and rarely checked due to time constraints.  At
least one substantial perfromance prediction error was attributed to this situation.  It was
particularly embarrasing because it was a very simple error which could have been
easily been caught with a very high level checking process. Instead, the error lingered
undetected for several years before being identified and corrected. The interviewe also
mentioned felt that he felt a "standard work" approach could help avoid this situation.
It is interesting to note that the lessons learned regarding risk reduction wind tunnel
testing were not adhered to on the SW-24B which received its TC in 1985, 7 years after
the initial TC of the SW-24A. This later impacted the ceritification schedule as the
aircraft alternative empennage configuration iterations were designed, manufactured
and evaluated on the development flight test aircraft.  This was quite a surprise at the
time as this was considered a straight forward "re-engine" program.
The SW-24B performance on weight control at TC was also quite poor with respect to
the SW-24A. The aircraft was overweight by approximately 6 % based on weight empty,
20%   based on the perecentage of the aircraft weight which represents new and/or
redesigned systems.9
                                                          
9 About 2/3'd of the SW-24B weight empty is represented by legacy SW-24A systems with which there is no
uncertainty in its weight.
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Two explanations as to this phenomena were offered by interviewees. The first is based
on how vivid the organizations recollection of the pain of the prior traumatic experience.
The SW-24B followed the NUAC difficulties by about ten years, enough time to forget
the pain of the events. The second explanation was presented differently but may be
essentially the same. It focused on career paths of the experienced personnel who had
lived through the NUAC and SW-24A experiences. The efforts and the talent of many
of these were people and their contribution to the companies success was recognized
and they were promoted to higher level management positions within Swamp and
United Technologies. As their careers ascended, the availability of their experience to
the larger engineering workforce is reduced or eliminated and their former positions are
filled with lesser experienced personnel. Not to say that these personnel lack
experience in the broader context, but they are lacking the key experiences which
allows them to recognize the key technical and strategic decisions which differentiate
between success of failure in developing a new aircraft.
Over time, the recollections and protests the few remaining knowledgeable technocrats
are progressively less persuasive and subject to overriding rationalizations regarding a
new analysis, budget constraints or other which makes not prudent to do the prudent
thing.
In most cases, an employee who has made his point clear on an issue will not pursue it
to the point of jeapordizing his job. If he or she is convinced they communicated their
message clearly to the group at large, they are willing to drop the issue, commonly
documenting their position and the program and or managements decision not to heed
to their warnings.
The disparity between the SW-24 and SW-40 approach with regards to risk reduction
testing and early staffing had the most adverse impact in the area of handling qualities.
As detailed in reference (1), the series of windtunnel and hover stand tests and flight
simulation conducted during its design proved effective in minimizing empennage
76
configuration changes during flight testing. Most notable was the fact that the SW-24
team was prepared to evaluate several tail configurations going in to flight testing. The
SW-24 entered its flight test development program with a horizontal stabilator with
incidence actuated as a function of speed to provide good low speed pitch
characteristics and positive stick gradients throughout its operating speed range. It was
hoped that this system would not be necessary and that a fixed incidence stabilizer
would prove to be an adequate solution. The introduction of a fly by wire tail was not
considered desirable from a safety standpoint so long as the fixed tail performance
proved adequate. In addition, the team was prepared to evaluate other contingencies,
including a pitch bias actuator (a device that is used enhance the stick gradients) and
horizontal endplate and planform configurations. This preparation proved effective at
quickly solidifying the final configuration, a fixed horizontal tail with a pitch bias actuator.
The ability to change the horizontal tail pitch in flight proved valuable in reducing flight
testing time as high confidence A to B comparisons could be made quickly.
The approach to empennage development and handling qualities risk reduction for the
SW-40 also involved wind tunnel testing and flight simulation. However, as previously
stated, the amount of testing conducted was considerably less. Also, in all testing, a
single balance was used wheras the majority of  the 1/5 scale tests conducted with the
SW-24 utilized independent fuselage, wing and tail balances. This provided a much
higher fidelity information which was particularly important to the development of the
empenneage configuration. Hot wire velocity probes were also utilized to map the wake
velocities about the empennage.
The majority of empennage configuration development for the SW-40 was conducted on
the first two flight test vehicles. Steel mounting provisions which would accomadate a
variety of tail configurations was developed. Eight horizontal tail and two vertical tail
configurations and  were evaluated. In addition, some configurations were evaluated at
varying incidence and with modified airfoil contours to alter the lift slope characteristics.
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5.2.5 Discussion of Key Findings
Examination of these case studies showed a strong correlation between intellectual
capitalmetrics and the performance metrics for programs. The correlation was found at
both the intra-era and inter-era comparisons and within all metric categories. Deeper
investigation into the root causes of the correlation consistently validated them to be
true IC issues and not some confounding outside phenomena.
Although no numerical technology / tool metrics were assigned, it is clear that the MS
era programs, with superior tools across the board, achieved lower scores in all areas.
This is not to say that these tools did not provide benefit to these programs. In fact, both
the disco era programs likely could not have been executed with international partners
as they both were. In addition, the manufacturing quality of both MS era aircraft far
exceed their disco era counterparts.
Some negative impact was found to be associated with todays computational tools. Not
so much the tools themselves, but with regard to the tacit knowledge derived when
interacting with them. Two engineering managers interviewed, seperately and without
any solicitation, expressed the concept that todays tools, are much less effective at
developing the tacit knowledge of the users.
Sophisticated simulation models of all types, some with realistic graphic presentations
seem to command a greater level of creditability than they deserve in many cases. The
handling quality problems encountered by the SW-40 fit this description. The simulation
model used in the design of the aircraft configuration and its automatic flight control
system (AFCS) had many flaws, leading to significant design changes very late in the
program and program slippage. In digging for a root cause, it is clear that there were
significant shortcuts were taken with respect to supporting wind tunnel testing and
modelling effort needed to develop a model worthy of the level of confidence with which
it was being applied.
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It is appropriate to reinforce that there were highly experienced and senior
aerodynamacists and handling qualities engineers who brought these same critical
issues to the table at the appropriate time, early on in the development program. They
lobbied for more resources and wind tunnel testing and in their words, ignored.
Intellectual capital is not just about having the knowledge within the boundaries of the
company facilities. There must be enough "critical mass" of intellectual capital to
overcome making decisions that are counterproductive.  In short, there must be enough
experienced personnel at key meetings to recognize the cost avoidance value of, in this
example, doing more wind tunnel testing. In addition, they have to feel confident that
supporting this position will have positive rather than negative consequences. This is
difficult to do without some prior experience base and some confidence that other
participants in the meeting, like yourself will also lend their support.
The experience of SW-24B, encountering handling qualities issues avoided by its parent
aircraft the SW-24A sheds some light on the limitations of knowledge capture and
codification. A variety of internal "lessons learned" documents covering broad ranges of
issues and models had been published prior to the SW-24 program. Some were
codified as new design rules which would elimate a recurrence. The lessons were
adhered to during design and development of the SW-24A and are directly linked to
many of the SW-24A's "best in class" program performance mertic scores. As noted in
section 4, The success achieved with the SW-24 handling qualities and performance
development were also documented in industry technical papers.
However, just seven years subsequent to the SW-24 type certification, these same
codified rules were circumvented, causing significant program delays as the flight test
aircraft underwent many iterations of empennage modifications and months of
unplanned development flight testing. Essentially repeating one of the important lessons
learned during the development of the XSW-18. A decade later, the SW-40 followed suit
in also circumventing these same rules.
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Does this imply that it knowledge capture and codification is not effective approach to
mitigate the decay of intellectual capital. For Swamp aircraft yes, with the key to
understanding being provided by a story presented in section 4. The story describes a
latent error which went undetected for several years. The error would never have
escaped this organization if there was even a cursory check process in place. While the
error was eventually corrected leaving no residual damage to the program, it was
extremely embarassing to this organization. The punch line to the story is the
interviewee's statement that, " I think that a "standard work" approach could help avoid
this situation."
In essence, he was telling me that really was no standard work process within his
group. I path taken to accomplish a task was largely left up to the individuals discretion.
This was also determined to be the predominant approach in other engineering
organization. Publishing "lessons learned" documents and/or incorporating them as
process reivisions will not be effective at mitigating errors or retaining knowledge so
long as they are not part of a process which has been adopted by an organization.
These will stay buried in the back of an old grey filling cabinet if not process mandates
their incorporation. In the case of the SW-24A, the personnel who lived through and
wrote these "lessons Learned" where still directly involved in the day to day processes.
There was no need for them to check this filing cabinet to review these lessons learned.
"the pain could still be felt" as one interviewee put it. Incorporating the process of
checking the filing cabinet is for the engineers that will be hired five and ten years later.
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6 Summary
6.1 Strong Linkage between IC metrics and Program Performance Metrics was
established
6.2 No instances could be identified where of the use of modern / MS era
computational  tools offset reductions in program performance linked with
reductions in intellectual capital. Note:This is not to suggest that it is prudent or
even possible to stop using these types of tools.
6.3 Ignorance regarding the process and commitment required to ensure that
computational tools live up to their expectations was cited as causing major
delays in one of the case study programs
6.4 Engineering managers interviewed consistently presented the opinion that many
of the modern computatitional tools are much less effective at developing the
users tacit knowledge when compared with predessor analysis methods.
6.5 There must be adequate "critical mass" of intellectual capital. Having one
employee who has worked on every single aircraft and knows absolutely
everything there is to know will not get you where you need to go.
6.6 Knowledge capture and/or knowledge codification methods will not be effective if
they are implemented in non-process oriented environments.
6.7 A design and development team with experience weighted towards prototype
and experimental aircraft is likely to lack the disciplines required to bring a new
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aircraft design through certification and rate production within its specified
performance and schedule targets.
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Appendix A - Swamp Aircraft's PVP
Swamp employed the use of a weight PVP (Planned Value Profile) to counter weight
growth on the SW-24 during design and development. Simply stated, the weight target
is lowered by 5% during the early basic data phase and is allowed to grow 2% during
detail design, 1% during manufacturing and 2% during the test phase. If all goes
according to plan, the aircraft is delivered at the empty weight target. This methodology
was first implemented on the DemVal (Demonstration and Validation) phase of the
NUAC program after experiencing overweight problems during the prototype phase. It
was a great success, with the production SW-18 being delivered under weight by 3%.
The concept was developed from a study weight growth study of many aircraft during
development.  Figure 6-1 presents an generic illustration of Swamp's weight PVP
methodology10.
 Figure 6-1: PVP Illustration
                                                          
10 Swamp's use of  PVP's is not limited to weight control. The concept has been applied to many key aircraft
attributes such as, range, rate of climb, Vmax etc, on the SW-24 and other programs.
